Free From the Shadow of WWII

On September 19, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party pushed a highly controversial piece of legislation through the upper house of the National Diet. Almost seventy years after Japan’s postwar constitution was put into place, a new policy of “collective self-defense” will enable Japan to train and deploy troops in defense of both itself and allied nations. As China expands its military operations, conflict grows in the Middle East, and the United States continues to pivot to Asia, the development of a true Japanese military will substantially change the status quo of international diplomacy and conflict.

The 1947 Japanese “peace” constitution, drafted by the occupying United States, banned the use of a military except to defend Japan itself. Although Japan has maintained a contingent of “self-defense forces” since 1954, military expenditure makes up less than 1 percent of Japan’s GDP and “National Defense”—which includes both diplomatic efforts and military expenditure—made up only 5.2 percent of Japan’s budget in 2014 (compared to 18 percent of the US budget in the same year). The new legislation reinterprets the constitution to allow Japan to extend military aid to its allies, including logistical support and minesweeping operations, even when military action is not directly linked to Japan’s homeland security.

Opposition to the new policy is forceful and wide-ranging. Protesters ranging from student activists and mothers with young children to professors of constitutional law rallied outside of the Diet building throughout the legislative process. The largest protest to date, on August 31, ran anywhere from 33,000 to 120,000 people, according to police and organizer estimates, respectively. Survivors of the 1945 atomic bomb attacks asked Abe to withdraw the legislation at a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the Diet, the opposition parties spoke out against the legislation, filibustered, and finally staged a walkout on the day of the final vote. And now that the legislation has become law, a group of constitutional scholars plan to sue the government on the basis of the policy’s unconstitutionality.

For many protesters, collective self-defense is a betrayal of Japan’s long-held pacifism. For a country that rebuilt itself from economic, political, and social destruction around US-instilled principles of democracy and nonviolence, the new legislation is a jarring and worrisome change. Michio Yamada, 75, a protester interviewed by the Japan Times, talked about the firebombing of Tokyo and the rise of nuclear weapons. “You never know how massive a death toll is going to be,” he said. “The danger is far bigger than before. We should never let it happen again.”

Collective self-defense has ignited controversy elsewhere in Asia as well. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense claimed the legislation “breached the restrictions of Japan’s pacifist constitution” and urged Japan to “learn lessons from history and listen to the just appeal of its people and the international community,” while an article from the Xinhua News Agency criticized Japan’s “cold war mentality.” In South Korea, the Yonhap News Agency warned of “unwanted Japanese boots on the peninsula.”

However, Japan’s defense spending has remained essentially unchanged for the last ten years, increasing by only 2 percent this year. Compared to China, whose defense spending increased by 170 percent from 2004 to 2013, some believe that the response to shifting Japanese legislation is overblown. Ezra Vogel, professor emeritus at Harvard and a well-respected scholar of Japanese politics, argues that much of the international attention stems from the reactions of China and South Korea. “They’re making it into a big discussion,” Vogel says. “If China and Korea show more willingness in discussion, there will be less international attention and less headlines.” However, Vogel conceded that Japanese public opinion is unlikely to change. Even if cooperation occurs between Asian governments, the legacy of World War II informs the conversation. And with a majority of the Japanese population against remilitarization, what is motivating Abe’s push for collective-self defense?

The Pentagon, Vogel argues, has a hand in the new legislation. The United States has welcomed the possibility of a stronger military ally in the Pacific and security experts in Japan cite US military cooperation as justification for the new policies. “There are people in the Pentagon talking with Japan, encouraging collective self-defense,” Vogel says, as it is easier to maintain public support in the US for military operations—for example, minesweeping in the Middle East—with the support of the Japanese military.

Regional unrest is another factor motivating the Japanese government. Unfortunately for Abe and the new legislation, recent attention on the Japanese military has rested on ambiguous apologies for war crimes, revisionist strains in the majority government, and visits to the highly controversial Yasukuni shrine. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have caused friction between China and Japan, raising concerns about regional expansion and increasing nationalism.

Finally, Abe and his supporters hope to make Japan a “normal” country with military investment in international security: a proud, modern Japan free of the shadow of World War II. The legislation’s opponents—at home and abroad—hold a vision of Japan as a pacifist, industrial country that relies on “soft power” rather than military might. The legacy of World War II, they believe, should still inform the policy of Japan and its unique role on the international stage. “We’re not talking about great changes,” Vogel argues. “There’s no great change in national identity.”

Nevertheless, collective self-defense marks a dramatic departure from explicitly peaceful policy and a move toward more traditional military involvement. Japan will decide to what extent it is defined by peace, World War II, and “normal” national defense—and reinterpret the role it has held on the world stage since 1947. The implications of this decision reach past Japan’s borders and mark both the decline of a traditional pacifist power and the rise of a new military force.

The image featured in this article is licensed under Creative Commons. The original image can be found here.